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We investigate the failure mechanisms of load sharing complex systems. The system is composed
of multiple nodes or components whose failures are determined based on the interaction of their
respective strengths and loads (or capacity and demand respectively) as well as the ability of a
component to share its load with its neighbors when needed. We focus on two distinct mechanisms
to model the interaction between components’ strengths and loads. The failure mechanisms of these
two models demonstrate temporal scaling phenomena, phase transitions and multiple distinct failure
modes excited by extremal dynamics. For critical ranges of parameters the models demonstrate
power law and exponential failure patterns. We identify the similarities and differences between the
two mechanisms and the implications of our results to the failure mechanisms of complex systems
in the real world.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Da, 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Kd, 05.10.-a, 02.70.-c
In the last decade a significant body of research has ac-
cumulated in the study of complex systems, their struc-
ture and dynamics [1]. Static robustness in terms of node
removals have been explored in [2]. But most real net-
works undergo dynamic failures where the failure of a
single or multiple nodes might trigger cascades of failure
through the network. Dynamical redistribution of flow
have been considered in different real world networks:
power grids [3], air transportation networks [4], and com-
munication networks [5].
Many physical systems fail as their capacity or strength
degrades over time under constant load or load increases
over time as strength remains fixed. For example, loss
of strength phenomena is observed in stress-rupture or
creep rupture [6], tire wear, and level of fluid in a hy-
draulic system [7]; whereas load buildup is commonly
considered in fiber-bundle models on complex systems
[8, 9]. Failure occurs when component load is greater
than its strength. Component failure due to overload-
ing is a serious threat in networks: a single component
failure and its subsequent load redistribution can trig-
ger cascades of failures through the network, ultimately
bringing down the entire system [3, 8].
On the other hand, many communication and trans-
portation systems exhibit congestion phenomena as data
or customer traffic density increases beyond certain
thresholds. Congestion or jamming phenomena for crit-
ical values of traffic density has been demonstrated in
models of transportation [10] and communication net-
works [11–13]. Traffic flow models for air transportation
systems have been explored in [4, 14, 15]. Congestion in
one part of the network has the effect of rerouting traffic
to other parts of the network resulting in slowing down
or clogging traffic in the entire system.
In this work we explore two different models of inter-
action between component strength and load to under-
stand the failure mechanisms of complex systems. The
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first one is a Loss of Strength (LOS) model where compo-
nents lose strength over time following prescribed rules.
The second one is a Customer Service (CS) model where
component demand is modeled through customer or data
traffic arrival rate. For both models we investigate the
strength-load interaction both at and below critical load-
ing levels [8, 16]. At critical loading levels and above the
entire system abruptly collapses, which we refer to as the
critical state.
First, we describe the general system setup. We imple-
ment both models on two different network topologies:
individual components organized in a n × n lattice or
a scale-free (SF) network of n2 components following a
power law degree distribution P (k) ∼ Ak−γ , with expo-
nents 2 < γ < 3. The SF network is constructed using
the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) algorithm [17]. The BA SF
model is a growth and preferential attachment algorithm
where at each iteration step a new node is attached to
“m” existing nodes in the network, where m is a con-
stant input parameter. At the end of the iteration steps,
a scale-free network of average degree 〈k〉 = 2m is ob-
tained. We generate BA SF networks for m ∈ (2, 4, 6)
which results in average degree 〈k〉 ∈ (4, 8, 12). These
choices of 〈k〉 cover a range of communication, biological
and social networks in the real world [1]. In both network
topologies each component can be in one of three possible
modes: fully operational, stressed, and failed. We denote
by (i, j) the location of a component in the lattice. For
the scale-free configuration we number the components
from 1 to n2. Next we describe the LOS model in the
lattice configuration.
For the LOS model on a lattice topology each compo-
nent is initialized with a specific strength Sij . Compo-
nent loads Lij are initialized with the same value and
during the simulation are not exogenously varied. If
Lij ≤ ηSij , where η ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter to con-
trol strength degradation threshold, then the component
is fully operational and strength does not degrade. If
ηSij < Lij ≤ Sij then the component at (i, j) is consid-
ered stressed and loss of strength takes place over time.
2We consider deterministic loss of strength for components
[7]. The components strength degradation follows the
relationship Stij = −αt + S
t′
ij where α is the strength
degradation rate parameter, t is the time and St
′
ij de-
notes the strength at time t = t′ when component LOS
commences. If Lij > Sij then the component fails and
the load is redistributed equally to the components im-
mediate neighbors in the system. Once a component fails
it is removed from the network.
The objective of the Sij and Lij initializations is to
capture the interaction dynamics of component strength
and load. The simulations work in the following way, first
all component loads are set to a specific value Lij = L
where L ∈ [0.5..4]. During a simulation L is not exoge-
nously varied. For each load setting L, 30,000 Monte-
Carlo simulations are carried out and Sij is reinitialized
for each simulation. To generate a mix of strong and weak
components, Sij is initialized from a real uniform distri-
bution U [6, 10]. To initiate LOS dynamics, for each sim-
ulation 4-5 components are initialized to a stressed mode
Lij > ηSij where deterministic loss of strength takes
place. As L is steadily increased, we arrive at critical
ranges of L where interaction between components Lij
and Sij trigger LOS dynamics and load redistributions
for increasingly greater number of components. This al-
lows us to capture the failure mechanisms of the system.
In the simulations t = k∆t with ∆t = 0.1, k = 1..500,
n = 12, η = 0.7 and α = 0.2. The components at the
boundary are initialized to very high strength to prevent
failure. Since boundary components do not fail we do
not need to deal with their load redistributions.
In the SF network case each component has neighbors
following a power-law degree distribution. The simula-
tion initializations for LOS SF network model is the same
as the lattice configuration except with n2 = 100 and for
each simulation we generate a BA SF network. Also by
construction all components for the LOS model on a SF
network have neighbors so special handling of boundary
components is not necessary.
Next we describe the CS model on a lattice configura-
tion. For the CS model we have taken a “Eulerian” [18]
point of view for component flow dynamics as opposed
to the standard “Lagrangian” point of view of our refer-
ences. Component demand is modeled as a customer or
data arrival rate λ. Although traffic in real communica-
tion networks is non-Poissonian [12, 19], as a first step we
follow [11, 14] and model customer demand as a Poisson
process with rate λ. The rate λ is the same for all com-
ponents and does not vary during a simulation. Thus the
system is in effect subjected to a uniformly distributed
globally varying load. Component capacity is modeled
through a fixed customer departure rate γij . In addition,
each component possesses an associated queue qij for ex-
tra storage capacity. At a given time step if λ ≤ γij then
the component is fully operational. If λ > γij then the
excess demand (λ − γij) is redistributed to the fully op-
erational neighbors of the component. Excess demand is
transferred sequentially to the neighbors with the largest
spare capacity (γij − λ) > 0 where (i, j) denotes the lo-
cation of the neighbors. If component demand redistri-
bution is successful then the component remains fully
operational. The component excess demand redistribu-
tion might be partially or completely unsuccessful. In
that event, the remaining excess demand is placed in
the queue qij for processing in the next time step. If
the remaining excess demand is placed in qij successfully
then the component at (i, j) is considered stressed. If
the remaining excess demand overwhelms qij then the
component is considered congested (failed) as it is not
able to service the traffic demand. Once a component is
congested it is taken off the grid.
Similar to the LOS model, we capture the interac-
tion between component capacity and demand for the
CS model through critical ranges of λ that trigger de-
mand redistribution and congestion. In our simulations,
component capacities γij are initialized by sampling from
a integer uniform distribution U [8, 12] to generate a mix
of strong and weak components. We run 30,000 Monte-
Carlo simulations for each integer value of λ ∈ [5, 11].
For each simulation the system is initialized with new
capacities γij . Each simulation is run for t = k∆t = 500
time steps where ∆t = 1. The queue size is set to q = 6
and n = 12. For our ranges of λ the queue essentially
provides components additional time to prevent failure.
Boundary components have queue’s set to large values to
prevent component failure and avoid load redistribution.
For the CS model on a SF network we have n2 = 100 and
due to circular boundary conditions special handling of
boundary components is not necessary.
Before presenting our results we note a important dif-
ference between the CS and LOS models. In the LOS
model, a component’s load redistribution is the final step
before it fails: once LOS dynamics is initiated the com-
ponent will fail and an attempt will be made to redis-
tribute its load. In the LOS model a component can un-
dergo, at most, one load redistribution. In the CS model
a component is essentially renewed through successful ex-
cess demand redistribution. The component fails only if
the load redistribution is unsuccessful and the associated
component queue qij is overwhelmed. In the CS model a
component can complete multiple excess demand redis-
tributions and remain fully operational.
Another important point is regarding failed component
load that is not successfully redistributed. In both mod-
els we shed the load and consider it lost. This is common
in the context of internet traffic where packets are rou-
tinely discarded when routers are congested [20]. Simi-
larly, power grid substations have mechanisms which take
them offline during capacity/demand imbalances [21].
Next, we define two quantities measured in the simu-
lations. During each simulation components fail as the
system evolves in time. We denote by ‘TF’ (Terminal
Failure) the number of component failures at the end of
a simulation. TF is a measure of the degree of system
failure. We denote by ‘TT’ (Terminal Time) the time
step when the penultimate component failure occurred.
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FIG. 1. LOS model distributions. TF distributions (top row); TT distributions (bottom row).
TT can be interpreted as the time the system achieves a
pseudo steady-state.
The TF and TT distributions for different values of
load initialization for the LOS model on a lattice con-
figuration are shown in Fig. 1. At loading L = 0.5 the
system is far from critical. At these loading levels com-
ponent failures are mainly due to components that were
initialized to commence LOS and their subsequent load
redistributions to weak components. At these loading
levels the systems are resilient to chains of cascading fail-
ure triggered by load redistribution, this fact is indicated
by Fig. 1(a).
As the initialization load is increased, transition load
conditions can be identified for L = 2, 2.5. The bi-
modal distributions in Fig. 1(b), 1(c) resemble bathtub
like curves that are commonly observed in reliability of
complex systems [22]. In Fig. 1(c) half the simulations
represent systems with all components failing. The other
half represent systems constituting partial component
failures. This implies for approximately 50% of the sim-
ulations the system strength topology is such that cas-
cading chains of load redistributions are triggered which
eventually bring down the entire system. For the other
50% of simulations the system strength topology is strong
enough to withstand the load redistributions thus avoid-
ing a cascading chain of failures. Transition load settings
are similar to ‘tipping points’ or ‘critical thresholds’ [23].
In our simulation framework, at tipping-points systems
may or may not, depending on system strength topology,
descend into catastrophic failure.
Recalling that TF represents the degree of system fail-
ure for a given simulation, let T˜ F denote “smoothed”
versions of TF. T˜ F exhibits temporal scaling phenom-
ena for the LOS model for load values lower than the
transition load on both the lattice and SF networks of
〈k〉 = 12. T˜ F is constructed in the following way. Re-
ferring to the TF and TT distributions in Fig. 1, each
point in the TF distribution has a associated point in
the TT distribution. For a particular system loading L,
we bin the TF distribution in groups of 4 in ascending
order and denote them by T˜ F i with value set to the min-
imum TF value in the bin [24]. For each bin we find the
corresponding values in the TT distribution and compute
their mean, denoted 〈TT 〉i. We illustrate the temporal
scaling phenomena of T˜ F in Fig. 2 for different values of
loading for the LOS model in both lattice and SF network
configurations. In Fig. 2, T˜ F versus 〈TT 〉 is plotted in
a log-log scale. Each circle in the figures represents the
mean of a TT distribution conditioned on a T˜ F i.
From these figures the following scaling relation is es-
tablished for loading values far below the critical load,
〈TT 〉 = κT˜F
τ
(1)
Table I tabulates the numerical values for κ and τ
for different values of load. At low values of load, Fig-
ures 2(a) and 2(c), the logarithm of T˜ F scales linearly
versus the logarithm of 〈TT 〉. As the initial load setting
is increased, a breakpoint develops and the T˜ F ’s sepa-
rate into two different log-log linear scales, as illustrated
in Figs. 2(b), 2(d). The slopes of the figures indicate
the second group of T˜ F ’s have faster transition dynam-
ics to 〈TT 〉 compared to the first T˜ F group. Table I also
tabulates the break point T˜ F when the switch to faster
transition dynamics occurs and the residual error of the
data fit.
All systems in the LOS lattice configuration undergo
complete failure at the critical load L = 4, as seen in
Fig. 1(d) and T˜ F is characterized by a first-order phase
transition into the critical state [Fig. 4(a)]. We define the
41.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.60
0.5
1
1.5
lo
g
1
0
(T˜
F
)
log10(<TT>)
 
 
 
Slope = 1.1
(a)Lattice network L = 0.5
2 2.2 2.4 2.60
0.5
1
1.5
2
log10(<TT>)
lo
g
1
0
(T˜
F
)
 
 
Slope = 19
Slope = 1.4
(b)Lattice network L = 1.5
2 2.2 2.4 2.60
0.5
1
1.5
2
log10(<TT>)
lo
g
1
0
(T˜
F
)
 
 
Slope = 1.2
(c)Scale-Free network
L = 0.5, 〈k〉 = 12
1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7
0.5
1
1.5
2
log10(<TT>)
lo
g
1
0
(T˜
F
)
 
 
Slope = 11
Slope = 1.2 
(d)Scale-Free network
L = 1.5, 〈k〉 = 12
FIG. 2. T˜ F temporal scaling for the LOS model, lattice con-
figuration (top row) and SF network (bottom row). The plots
are on a base 10 log-log scale.
critical load as the load required for complete system fail-
ure, TF = 99 or 100, with probability greater than 0.95.
For the LOS model on SF networks the critical load is
slightly higher at L = 4.5 for 〈k〉 = 12, L = 5 for 〈k〉 = 8
and L = 5.5 for 〈k〉 = 4. Here we recall that compo-
nent strengths are initialized in the real number interval
U [6, 10] with η = 0.7, meaning that for L > 6× 0.7 = 4.2
a considerable number of components will be initialized
in the stressed mode Lij > ηSij . To induce system failure
in LOS SF networks, with decreasing 〈k〉 more and more
components need to be initialized to commence failure
dynamics. The implication being that the LOS model
is increasingly resilient to system failure with decreasing
average network connectivity 〈k〉. This result is in agree-
ment with [2] which demonstrate that scale free networks
are more resilient to random errors or failure [25] com-
pared to other network topologies.
The TT distribution fit for the LOS model at the crit-
ical loads is shown in Fig. 3. The LOS model on a lattice
configuration for L = 4 is shown in Fig. 3(a). In the lat-
tice configuration the LOS model fits a power law distri-
bution Prob(TT ) = αTT−β with β = 3.5 and α = 105.9.
The LOS model on SF networks with L = 4.5, 〈k〉 = 12
is shown in Fig 3(b). With probability 0.97 the model
fits a power law distribution Prob(TT ) = αTT−β with
β = 2.6 and α = 104.2. The LOS model on SF networks
with L = 5, 〈k〉 = 8 is shown in Fig 3(c) and L = 5.5,
〈k〉 = 4 is shown in Fig 3(d). As can be seen from the fig-
ures, at the critical load as average degree 〈k〉 decreases
the TT distributions loose their power-law scaling. Im-
plying at the critical load, the LOS model looses power-
law scale invariance in system failure time distribution
with decreasing average network connectivity 〈k〉.
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FIG. 3. LOS model TT distributions at the critical load. Note
the breakdown in power law scaling with decreasing average
network connectivity.
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FIG. 4. Phase transition of the LOS lattice model
The phase diagram of the LOS lattice model is shown
in Fig. 4. The LOS lattice model demonstrates phase di-
agrams similar to both first-order and second-order phase
transitions. At the critical load L = 4, cascades of load
redistributions induce massive failure causing all systems
to fail as shown in Fig. 1(d). The corresponding first-
order phase diagram is shown in Fig. 4(a). The loading
at L = 4 is such that cascading load redistributions in-
duce failure with minimal LOS dynamics. At transition
loadings L = 2, systems undergoing complete failure [re-
fer to Figs. 1(b), 1(c)] exhibit second-order phase tran-
sitions as shown in Fig. 4(b). For second-order phase
transitions, the transition to complete system failure is
a gradual process involving repetition of LOS dynamics
and load redistributions cascading from one component
to the next.
Here we note, first and second-order phase transi-
tions for traffic congestion in complex networks have also
been reported in [5, 26]. In [5], the authors show that
by increasing the probability of node congestion (from
5η¯ = 0.05 to η¯ = 0.95, where η¯ is a parameter to control
node congestion probability) the traffic flow phase dia-
gram switches from second-order to first-order. On the
other hand in [26], the first or second-order phase tran-
sitions depend on the particular traffic routing protocol
utilized (shortest-path routing versus traffic-aware rout-
ing). In comparison for the LOS model, by increasing the
load from L = 2 to L = 4, the component failure phase
diagram switches from second-order to first-order.
The TF and TT distributions for the CS model on a
lattice configuration are shown in Fig. 5. The CS model
on a SF network demonstrates qualitatively similar dis-
tributions. Loadings λ = 6, 7 correspond to transition
loadings for these systems. The multi-modal nature of
the TF distributions in Figs. 5(b), 5(c) indicate that
multiple failure modes are present in the distributions.
Multi-modal distributions have been observed in nature
in the eruption of geysers [27] and sizes of ants [28].
To isolate and identify the different failure modes, we
filter the TF distributions based on the capacities of the
failed components. Recall that in simulating the CS
model we initialize component capacities from a inte-
ger uniform distribution U [8, 12]. In Fig. 6(a) we color
code the TF distribution for λ = 6 [Fig. 5(b)] based on
the capacities of the failed components. From Fig. 6(a)
the composition of the different failure modes becomes
clear. The TF distribution for λ = 6 is composed of
a failure mode where only components of capacity= 8
fail, a second failure mode where only components of
capacity= (8, 9) fail, a third failure mode where only
components of capacity= (8, 9, 10) fail and so on. Simi-
larly we can filter the TF distribution for λ = 7.
It is also of interest to understand the dynamics that
are exciting the multiple failure modes for transitions
loadings λ = 6, 7. Motivated by Extreme Value The-
ory [29] one explanation lies in the demand dynamics.
Although the average demand on the system is λ = 6
or 7; the CS model is sensitive to the extremal behav-
ior of the demand dynamics. Extremal events have been
modeled in areas as diverse as finance [30] to earthquake
characterization [31]. In Fig. 6(b) we plot the extremal
behavior of the demand dynamics as a function of TF for
λ = 6. The figure is constructed in the following way: in
Fig. 6(a) for each TF ∈ [1, 100], we first determine the
maximum demand seen by each of the systems in their as-
sociated window [0, TT ]. For each TF ∈ [1, 100] we then
compute and plot, the mean maximum demand (shown
in blue), the maximum maximum demand (shown in red)
and the minimum maximum demand (shown in green).
In Fig. 6(b) we can clearly observe the staircase like
growth trend of mean maximum demand as a function
of TF and the step function growth of the associated
min/max bounds of maximum demand. It is our opinion
the extremal behavior of the demand dynamics [32] in
conjunction with the structure of the component capacity
topology is responsible for exciting the multiple distinct
failure modes observed in Fig. 6(a).
For example in Fig. 6 consider the interval TF ∈
[10, 25]; mean maximum demand in this interval roughly
corresponds to around 14 with components of capacity=
8 failing. Noting that the queue size is 6, we can un-
derstand why components of capacity= 8 are being over-
whelmed by the mean maximum demand (8 + 6 = 14)
in this interval. However, in addition to the specific
sequence and number of extremal demands, relatively
stronger neighborhood capacity topologies are partly re-
sponsible for the left side of the bell shape and relatively
weaker neighborhood capacity topologies are partly re-
sponsible for the right side of the bell shape in the in-
terval TF ∈ [10, 25]. For a specific level and sequence of
extremal demand, a relatively stronger neighborhood ca-
pacity topology provides components a greater opportu-
nity to survive through load sharing. We could construct
similar arguments for the other bell curve like waves in
Fig. 6 such as the interval TF ∈ [30, 50] where compo-
nents of capacity= (8, 9) are failing and mean maximum
demand is approximately 15.
The result in Fig. 6 is similar in spirit to results in
[33], where the authors show using shell models of tur-
bulence that large fluid velocity fluctuations propagating
from shell to shell cause multiscaling in the shell velocity
variation distributions. In other words the velocity vari-
ation distribution is composed of two separate regions,
the first due to “small” but “usual” velocity fluctuations
and the second due to “large” but “rare” velocity fluc-
tuations. Comparing to our results in Fig. 6, we can see
the extremal demand dynamics exciting different scales
of failure in the TF distribution.
The TT distribution fit for the CS lattice model at
the critical load λ = 11 is shown in Fig. 7. At the
critical load the CS model fits a exponential distribu-
tion Prob(TT ) = 1µe
−TT/µ with parameter µ = 19.06
[Fig. 7(b)]. The CS model on SF networks demonstrates
similar results. In communication and transportation ap-
plications M/M/1 queues have arrivals according to pois-
son processes and service time distributions are expo-
nential [34]. Although individual components in the CS
model resemble M/D/1 queues [35], at critical demand
rates the load sharing capability of the CS model is ren-
dered redundant and the structure of the component ca-
pacity topology causes the system to demonstrate expo-
nential distribution failure times. Here we also note that
exponential and sub-exponential distributions have been
widely reported in financial applications such as draw-
downs of the stock market, major currencies and major
financial indices [36]. The relationship between the ex-
tremal dynamics of the CS model and market drawdowns
presents an interesting subject for future investigation.
To summarize, we have used the concept of compo-
nent strength and load interaction to investigate the
failure mechanisms of complex systems utilizing two
different strength/load interaction models. The LOS
model explores strength/load interaction through a loss
of strength mechanism. The CS model explores capac-
ity/demand interaction through customer or data ar-
rival/departure rate mechanism. At low levels of load-
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FIG. 5. CS model distributions. TF distributions (top row); TT distributions (bottom row).
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ing which correspond to lower network utilization, the
failure mechanisms in the LOS model follow predictable
trends [Eq. 1 and Fig. 2]. The failures in the systems
can be managed and network resources are sufficiently
allocated. The system is resilient to cascading failure
triggered by load redistribution.
At transition loadings or ‘tipping-points’, both mod-
els demonstrate increasingly unpredictable behavior with
system volatility and increasing disorder. Systems may
or may not descend into catastrophic failure and extremal
dynamics excite multiple failure modes in systems. The
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FIG. 7. CS model TT distribution fit at the critical load
results imply that at these loadings the system resources
(characterized by the system strength topology) need to
be allocated appropriately to avoid catastrophic failure.
For critical loads system failure is reached through
phase transitions. At criticality, depending on the
strength/load interaction mechanism, systems demon-
strate power law or exponential temporal failure pat-
terns.
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